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ABSTRACT 
The paper reinterprets Keynes’s analysis of the crisis in the Lancashire cotton industry 
in the 1920s. It presents empirical evidence showing that syndicates of local 
shareholders, but not the banks, were an important brake on firms exiting, at a time 
when exit barriers were otherwise unproblematic in this competitive industry. 
Moreover, syndicates milked firms of any profits through dividends, thereby limiting 
reinvestment and re-equipment possibilities. The case shows that where laissez-faire 
fails in response to a crisis, the associated response may need to assess both ownership 
structure and its relationship to competitive industry structure. 
 
Keywords: Keynes, Cotton, Banks, Syndicates 
JEL classification: G32; G35; L14; L67; N84. 
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Keynes and the cotton industry: A reappraisal 
 
1. Introduction 
In the End of Laissez-Faire writing against the backdrop of the inter-war economic 
crisis, Keynes (1927, pp. 46-7) argued that the role of the government is not to try to do 
what is being done better, but to do what is not being done. For Keynes, there was no 
better illustration of this point than the Lancashire cotton textile industry. As demand in 
overseas export markets collapsed, creating a serious problem of over-capacity, the 
industry’s large number of relatively small firms competed intensely on the basis of 
marginal cost pricing. For Keynes the solution was the reorganisation of the industry. 
An important obstacle was the intractability of the incumbent management and 
financial stakeholders. The banks might have promoted reorganisation, but were 
‘professional paralytics’, and it was ‘against their tradition to do anything whatsoever 
in any conceivable circumstances’ (Keynes, 1981, 605). He also called for the dismissal 
of the vast majority of cotton company directors, adding that the people required to vote 
on such a proposal were precisely those directors (Keynes, 1981: 631). However, 
Keynes was careful in his choice of scapegoats. In particular he sought to avoid 
implicating those responsible for the re-financing of the industry already carried out in 
the boom of 1919-20. Contemporary commentators who stressed the problems 
resulting from these events, were criticised by Keynes for finding easy solace and 
standing in the way of educating opinion as to what he saw as the correct diagnosis 
(Keynes, 1928, p.199).  
Below we present new evidence to test the propositions that follow from 
Keynes’s arguments. Specifically we examine statistical and archival evidence to 
examine the relative impacts of investments by different groups of financial 
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stakeholders on the strategies of individual firms. The results suggest that Keynes was 
too dismissive of the re-financing and the problems it caused and that investor groups in 
particular were at least as serious, if not more of an obstacle, than the banks. The 
assertion is important, as it shows that the Keynesian panacea of reorganisation was 
insufficient and that restructuring, including radical variation of ownership rights, was 
also required. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we compare and contrast the key 
features of Keynes’s analysis of the industry’s problems with those of other informed 
contemporaries. Particular emphasis is placed on the observation that, unlike his 
contemporaries, Keynes was generally dismissive of the impact of re-flotation.  In 
Section 3 the composition of financial syndicates is analysed. Notwithstanding 
contemporary and subsequent debates, there is no prior empirical evidence concerning 
the composition of these groups. Indeed there are only passing references to ‘London’ 
and ‘Metropolitan’ syndicates and our research shows that these references are partially 
and materially inaccurate. Section 4 examines the role of investor groups, both 
syndicates and banks, and their impact on firm level performance outcomes, using a 
financial data set and appropriate econometric models. The comparative impact of bank 
lending and financial syndicate investment is assessed. Conclusions are presented in 
Section 5. 
 
2. Keynesian and other interpretations of the collapse  
The fundamental feature of the Lancashire textile industry between the wars was the 
violent and, as it turned out, irreversible contraction in world demand for cotton goods. 
The broad facts of this collapse have been extensively documented. The salient points 
are that during the 1920s, and 1930s, exports of cotton piece goods were 58% and 29 % 
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respectively of their 1913 level.  For yarn exports, the relevant figures were 80% and 
66% respectively.i Of particular importance in this collapse were the loss of the Indian 
market and Japanese competition in third markets.  In 1913, out of a total British 
production of approximately 700 million yards of cotton piece goods, 43 % by quantity 
and 36% by value, were exported to India.ii By the 1930s, Indian production of cotton 
piece goods and yarn was 34% and 131% greater, respectively, than its pre-war average. 
A number of factors, including the disruption caused by the war, reduced shipping 
facilities, growing nationalism and increasing tariff protection, account for India’s 
reduced dependence on Lancashire exports. The reversal in the Indian market was 
exacerbated by Japanese competition. Between 1914 and 1930, Japan’s share of Indian 
imports of cotton piece goods increased over a hundred-fold, and Bowker (1928) 
estimated that Japanese penetration of the Chinese market was responsible for 17.6% of 
the decline in Lancashire’s exports.   
However, although these basic facts were well known to contemporaries there 
was less agreement on what the industry should have done in order to restore its 
competitiveness. For convenience, we contrast two interpretations: one is Keynes’ view 
that reorganisation was required but the banks and industry directors prevented this 
outcome. The second is that advanced by other contemporaries that world economic 
conditions were to blame and recapitalization simply made matters worse (Daniels and 
Jewkes, 1928, p.182). 
Keynes’ analysis of the problems affecting the industry focused on excess 
capacity and, its consequence, short-time working. ‘The termination of the short-time 
policy is urgently called for, and the substitution for it of a ‘rationalising process’ 
designed to cut down overhead costs by the amalgamation, grouping or elimination of 
mills’, (Keynes, 1981, p.584).  Short-time working increased the costs of the industry, 
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aggravated financial losses, and led to ‘financial exhaustion’, (Keynes, 1981, p.582; 
p.590; p.597; 602;). Keynes was adamant that while a policy of short-time working 
might be desirable to meet temporary disturbances in trade, it was absolutely disastrous 
as a long-term solution (Keynes, 1981, p. 588; p.598).  In any case, as he pointed out, 
the actual practice of short-time working was very badly organised (Keynes, 1981, 
pp.596-7).   
The solutions to short-time working proposed by Keynes were threefold: the 
elimination of weak-sellers (those selling output below cost), the adjustment of surplus 
capacity and rationalisation to achieve appropriate economies (Keynes, 1981, p.598). 
Why, then, was the required contraction in capacity not forthcoming?  Keynes position 
on this was clear: the banks had lent so much to the industry, particularly its financially 
weaker companies, that they were loath to let their debtor companies go bankrupt, even 
though this would have accelerated the adjustment of capacity in the industry (Keynes, 
1981, p.605). In Keynes’ perspective, the banks could have promoted change in the 
industry  (Keynes, 1981, p.603; p.614), but chose not too (authors’ emphasis). Whilst 
castigating the banks, Keynes dismissed the significance of the re-capitalisation boom:  
‘The industry is riddled with unsound finance; some of it the result of the 
over-capitalisation of the boom period….If high capitalisation and bad 
management were the essential troubles, reconstructions and bankruptcies 
might be the right solution. But they are only secondary troubles. The real 
trouble – and this is the beginning, the middle and the end of my argument – is 
surplus capacity.’ (Keynes, 1981, pp.603-4). 
Keynes argued that the recapitalisations of the 1919-20 boom were irrelevant as they 
did not effect earnings, suggesting that even if this capital were written off the problem 
would persist without solving the underlying problem of over-capacity (Keynes, 1981: 
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629-31).  Therefore as far as Keynes was concerned, the writing-off of capital was 
trivial and the important challenge was reorganisation.  
In this respect, Keynes was not unique. Turning to the general problem of 
excess capacity there was recognition that rationalisation and re-organisation could 
improve the competitive position of industry, but the existence of a large fringe of small 
producers hampered the efforts of big firms trying to secure these efficiencies 
(MacGregor, 1927, 528).  John Ryan, (Managing Director of the Lancashire Cotton 
Corporation), argued that amalgamation and re-organisation would simultaneously 
help Lancashire to improve her international competitiveness  and provide  relief the 
spinning section which wasa labouring under heavy financial losses (Ryan, 1930, 359).   
In the specific case of the Lancashire cotton textile industry, the historiography since 
strongly endorses the Keynesian interpretation. Most acknowledge that over-capacity 
was a root cause (Keynes, 1981, Porter, 1974, Bamberg, 1988, Marchionetti, 1995, 
Bowden and Higgins, 1998). Opinions differ somewhat as to who should have taken 
responsibility. Bamberg adds to Keynes’ famous accusation that the bankers acted as 'a 
species of deaf mutes', abandoning their responsibilities (Keynes, 1981: 601), showing 
the competitive structure of bank lending to have been inimical to industry recovery 
(Bamberg, 1988: 26-30). Obstinate directors, whom Keynes suggested should be 
dismissed have been subsequently criticised for their ‘individualistic attitudes’ 
(Saxonhouse and Wright, 1987: 89), as have the unions for lack of co-operation 
(Lazonick, 1984: 396; Keynes, 1981: 578-637; Skidelsky, 1992: 261-3).  
For the second interpretation we need to consider contemporary opinion, since 
this view has attracted little support since. Whiggish attitudes and hindsight make it 
difficult for historians to do other than condemn this view, since it is well known that 
the hoped for return to pre-1914 conditions never materialised. Indeed contemporary 
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opinion was far from a consensus and such optimism attracted some ridicule (Dietrich, 
1928, Greaves, 2000). However, unlike Keynes, many informed contemporary 
observers did place much greater emphasis upon the harmful effects of the 
recapitalisation boom.  Daniels and Jewkes (1928, pp.180-181) and the report by 
Political and Economic Planning (1934, p.60), argued that those firms that had 
re-capitalised had stronger inducements to engage in price-cutting in order to secure the 
volumes required to cover their inflated costs. Both of these sources also suggested that 
the effects of recapitalisation worked against any effective joint action either regarding 
output restriction to raise prices (Daniels and Jewkes, 1928, p.181), or to secure 
amalgamation (PEP, 1931, p.60). Henry Clay, a special adviser to the Bank of England 
supported these views. He also argued that the supply of loan capital, which should 
have been available to finance re-equipment and facilitate re-organisation, had been 
drained away by the need of re-capitalised companies to call-up unpaid share capital in 
order to meet interest charges and to replace withdrawn loans (Clay, 1931, p.64). 
 It is therefore clear that contemporaries recognised some important 
relationships between re-capitalisation, over-capacity, individual firm behaviour, and 
weak-selling. The case also illustrates some important analytical relationships between 
principal and agent expectations and asset values (Filatochev and Toms, 2006). 
However, the precise role that the banks and the syndicates played in fostering exit has 
not been analysed. Indeed, until now, Keynes’ views on earnings, re-capitalisation and 
capital write-offs have not been questioned much in the subsequent literature (but see 
Higgins and Toms, 2003). None have presented significant new empirical evidence. 
Even so, an empirical analysis of the composition of the syndicates and their relative 
impact on individual firm behaviour compared to the banks is important. If the banks 
had an interest in preventing their clients exiting in order to avoid the consequent 
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capital write-offs, then so too did the financial syndicates. Arguably the syndicates had 
more reason and greater ability to force firms to stay in the industry. Banks had the 
relative benefit of secured lending, albeit on reduced asset values and even where 
minimal, stood to obtain any marginal benefit ahead of the unsecured equity syndicates. 
Where loan interest payments were deferred, they were allowed to accumulate so there 
was an expectation of higher payments in future years. Equity holders benefited only 
where the firm had sufficient earnings to depreciate the overvalued assets and meet 
fixed interest charges. Unlike the banks the syndicates had direct control over the board 
and the strategy of the firm through the control of voting shares. When Keynes called 
for the dismissal of the company directors, adding they were unlikely to vote for their 
own dismissal (Keynes, 1981: 631), whether they could do so or not remains an 
unresolved empirical question. Such resolutions could not be carried without the 
support of any outside ‘metropolitan’ syndicates, where such shareholdings were 
substantial. Although it is well known that cotton directors had shareholdings, whether 
they could not necessarily command majorities at annual general meetings depended on 
their extent. It is also known that directors were interlocked within the industry before 
1914 (Toms, 2002) and in the 1950s (Filatotchev and Toms, 2003; Toms and 
Filatotchev, 2004). However the role of cross directorships and shareholdings has not 
been examined for the crucial 1919-20 re-capitalisation boom. The presence of such 
network connections might impact on coalescence in the strategies advocated by the 
syndicates and any outside investor groups. Although convenient for the first 
interpretation of decline discussed above, the neglect of the role of the syndicates is 
therefore surprising, and the analysis below examines their effects, in contrast to the 
banks, more closely.  
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There is a further and potentially important consequence of the presence of 
these outside investors. Keynes and contemporariesiii seem to agree that they had little 
technical understanding or other useful knowledge of the industry (Keynes, 1981) other 
than perhaps its propensity to pay very generous dividends during periodic booms. In 
addition to the question of whether the syndicates forced firms to stay in the industry, 
there is the further question of their impact on business and financial strategy. 
Specifically it is likely that they would have forced the cotton companies to repay any 
profits from weak selling as dividends, so that the capacity for recovery through new 
investment could not be sustained. However, before testing hypotheses along these 
lines it is important to establish who precisely was involved in the re-capitalisation 
boom of 1919-1920.  
 
3.  The syndicates: scale and characteristics   
To examine ownership and control characteristics of the re-capitalised companies all 
available annual returns from the BT31 file at the Public Record Office (PRO) were 
examined. The PRO has a policy of retaining a random sample of 1 in 5 company 
records and it was therefore appropriate to examine all surviving documents for firms 
that were known to be in existence, and to have been re-capitalised (as detailed in 
Worrall’s and Tattersalls trade directories). The process produced a sample of 41 
individual company archives. Within each, share registers, articles of association and 
annual returns (form E) were examined to identify the directors and significant 
shareholders in the re-capitalised companies, the scale of their cross shareholdings, and 
the buy-sell and buy-hold behaviour of investing individuals and groups.  
The first outstanding feature was that block holders were usually inside 
directors. For example on initial allotment, two of the directors in Brunswick Mill 
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owned 31%; in Delta, the directors owned 28.3%; in Fern Mill it was 22.8%; Century 
Mill, 45.9%; Clover Mill, 35.6%, Belgrave, 35%, Avon, 65.4%; Argyll, 17%; Kent 
Mill, 12.4%. Outside ownership meanwhile was relatively rare. Only 3 out of 41 
companies had examples of significant outside ownership. Beehive Cotton Spinning 
Company in Bolton, attracted a London investment group.iv Manchester-based William 
P. Hartley (who had made money in preserves) invested in Textile Spinning Company 
and Asia Spinning Company. The third example was another Manchester investor, 
John Kenyon. It is significant that there was only one ‘metropolitan’ syndicate and that 
it invested in the least troubled section of the industry.v Bolton was the centre of the 
fine section of the industry and was relatively untroubled by the problems of 
over-capacity prevalent in the Oldham-centred coarse sector. Investors in Oldham 
firms where not from Oldham itself, were typically from neighbouring Manchester. 
Even then these outside investors were insignificant compared to the degree of 
inside control prevalent in the crisis-ridden Oldham section. Moreover, the Oldham 
insiders were interlocked. For example promoter and share dealer Sam Firth Mellor 
was a director of 18 companies,vi John Bunting, of the same occupation held 14. Harry 
Tweedale, a sharebroker for William Deacons Bank, was a director of Dale Mill and a 
founding director of Arrow Spinning Co and Century Spinning Co (in which he owned, 
or represented, 15.4% of the initial allotment of the stock).vii Many others held multiple 
directorships. For example of the directors of Century Mill, Deveney was also a 
director of Wellfield Mill, Victoria Spinning Company, and Slack Mills; Bleakley was 
a director of Dale Mill and Arkwright Mill, while Simms was a director of Era Mill. 
Another significant operator was J.S. Hammersley, who was also a director of several 
companies. Hammersley is notable because like Keynes he advocated the 
reconstruction of the industry. Unlike Keynes, he argued that the reconstruction should 
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be financial, involving the variation of claim-holders’ rights (Hammersley, 1931). His 
scheme was based on cash for equity, which as the argument below suggests was 
indeed necessary to rescue the industry. Compared to Keynes’s argument, it is easy to 
see why it was unpersuasive. His scheme not only compensated the speculators for their 
failure, but it also presupposed there were new investors whose expectations about the 
industry’s future were more optimistic than the incumbent investors (Higgins and Toms, 
2003).viii 
Inside directors were in any case significant and typically long-term investors. 
Outside investors exited completely and early, for example Hartley in 1920. Insiders 
made only partial disposals if at all, and such transactions usually involved 
stockbrokers such as Firth Mellor and Bunting. It is likely that the stockbrokers who 
were also directors simultaneously provided market liquidity in their own companies 
for potential buyers.ix Even so the total number of shareholders was usually quite small 
and there were surprisingly few transactions, given they were quoted companies. An 
obvious problem was the absence of buyers after the collapse of the boom in 1920. 
Moreover, given the evidence from the share registers, the presence of controlling 
cliques of directors was in itself sufficient to impose conditions of market illiquidity.  
There were relatively few examples of family block holders, and the holding in 
Coppull Ring Mill by the Hollas family was one exception. The Hollases represented a 
significant textile interest and were effectively insider investors. In the case of Avon 
Mill, for example, three families, the Hagues (cotton spinners), Brierley's (accountants 
and solicitors) and Braddocks (gas engineers) were the sole directors of the company 
and jointly owned 65.4% of the stock.  The Buntings, John and James Henry, were 
co-directors of Textile Mill, and James was also a director of Briar. The Cheetham 
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family owned 25.3% of Anchor; the Clegg family was on the boards of Cape Mill, 
Textile Mill and Anchor Mill 
 A final and very important feature was the striking continuity between these 
investor groups in the Oldham section and the operations of similar groups, sometimes 
involving the same individuals, in the pre 1914 period. A feature of previous booms, for 
example in 1907 was the involvement of Bunting in the mill promotion boom (Toms, 
2002). Firth Mellor and Hammersley were also involved in putting together business 
groups through flotation and inter-locking directorships (Farnie, 1998, p.10). Another 
important continuity was the involvement of successor generations. So James Henry 
Bunting continued his pre-war apprenticeship whilst successive generations of the 
architects and mill-designers A.H. Stott and Sons continued their practice of investing 
in the mills they helped to build.x In short, the investors of the 1919-20 re-capitalisation 
boom were local, inter-connected, had intensive knowledge of the industry and were 
continuing well-established practice from before 1914. The connection to pre-war 
behaviour is important, insofar as the practices established then contributed to the 
subsequent failure of the industry. The next section examines the extent of that 
contribution. 
 
4. Data and analysis 
To examine the differential behaviour of firms within the industry in the 1920s and 
1930s, with a particular focus on their governance arrangements, strategy and financial 
performance, a sample of 147 spinning firms was examined. The sample is based on the 
first year of extensively available accounting and share price data taken from the 
Tattersall’s trade journals from 1926 et seq, using all firms with available data. These 
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data were used to examine first the determinants of the decision to exit and second the 
determinants of financial performance.  
To examine the decision to exit, and the determinants of financial performance, 
data and financial information for the five-year period 1926-1931 was used in the 
following models: 
 
EXIT =  β1+β2RECAP + β3PUBLIC+ β4LEV+ β5SIZE + µ   (1) 
 
APTC  =  β1+β2RECAP + β3PUBLIC+ β4LEV+ β5SIZE + µ   (2) 
 
DIV  =  β1+β2RECAP + β3PUBLIC+ β4LEV+ β5SIZE + µ   (3) 
 
 
Model (1) has a discrete dependent variable, the decision to exit (EXIT), and is specified 
as a logit model. If a firm exits in the subsequent five years after 1926, EXIT is assigned 
a value of 1, = 0 otherwise. In model (2) the dependent variable is subsequent financial 
performance after 1926, defined as the ratio of accumulated profit/loss to total capital in 
1931 (APTC). In general the higher this ratio the more successful the firm and firms 
with positive ratios suffered no loss of capital in generally difficult trading 
circumstances and were able to pay dividends. The ratio is used as a proxy for 
turnaround success. In general only firms with positive accumulated profits paid 
dividends, but because dividends also reduce the balance of accumulated profits a third 
model was specified using the dividend rate (as a percentage of paid capital) as the 
dependent variable (DIV). Together these variables proxy for relative success, at least 
from the financial perspective of the individual firm. Because the dividend variable is 
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strongly left censored, model (3) is specified as a tobit model. Model (2) is ordinary 
least squares. 
The explanatory variables are common to both models and each is described in 
turn. The RECAP variable captures the fixed costs arising from governance structures. 
If the firm had recapitalised in the 1920 boom, it typically resold its shares to syndicates 
of outside investors at three times the price of non-recapitalised firms. Firms were 
classified 1 or 0 according to whether they had recapitalised or not. Recapitalised firms 
faced higher fixed costs arising from the change in ownership structure in the form of 
depreciation charges, dividends and interest charges. These costs are not fixed in the 
strict sense, for example dividends are highly discretionary, but they are sunk in the 
sense that they must be paid at some point if investors are to recover their committed 
capital. Because investors thereby had an incentive to force the firm to remain in the 
industry on the basis of expected future recovery of the committed investment, the 
expected sign on the RECAP variable is negative. RECAP also potentially proxies for a 
second variable of interest, the presence of syndicate investor groups.xi To observe 
these effects separately, a further variable is required. The availability of active share 
price quotations was used to proxy for the presence of outside investors, including 
equity syndicates, as opposed to the insider quasi partnership investors where no such 
trading opportunities existed. Quoted firms, with therefore approximately wider share 
ownership were labelled as PUBLIC and assigned a value of 1, = 0 otherwise. Although 
it has been noted that many of these firms were under control of their directors, there 
were nonetheless market transactions and their control was not as complete as a private 
firm. As closer controlled firms were under less pressure from outside investors to 
remain in the industry and thus more likely to exit, the expected sign for the PUBLIC 
variable is positive.  
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In addition to these categorical variables, two further continuous variables were 
included. First the ratio of debt to total capital, or leverage (LEV) and second, to control 
for size the total value of balance sheet assets of the firm are used (SIZE). The SIZE 
variable might also proxy for the power of incumbent managers, as a function of the 
value of the assets under their control. SIZE was transformed logarithmically to achieve 
closer proximity to normality, whereas LEV was not transformed due to a significant 
number of zero variables.  
The results are presented in Tables 1-4 Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive 
statistics. Table 3 shows the classification of the 147 firms according to their strategy: 
turnaround success (APTC>0), turnaround failures (APTC<0) and exits. Table 4 shows 
the results for models (1), (2) and (3) above.  
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 about here 
 
The RECAP variable is negative and strongly significant in model (1), showing 
that the presence of governance related fixed or sunk costs constitute an exit barrier. 
Table 3 confirms that relatively few recapitalised firms exited the industry. Where 
firms remained in the industry RECAP was associated with turnaround success, 
evidenced by the positive and significant co-efficients in models (2) and (3). The 
PUBLIC variable is also negative in model (1) and significant, supporting the 
hypothesis that outside investor groups prevented exit. Table 3 data also show that a 
very high proportion (50/58, or 86%) of successful turnarounds were public companies. 
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Although the PUBLIC variable is insignificant in model (2) it is positive and highly 
significant in model (3). Public ownership, albeit by the syndicates, is therefore 
associated with firms staying in the industry and with turnaround success but this is 
manifested in the form of high dividend payments and not the accumulation of profits. 
In other words, syndicate investment acted as an exit barrier, helped stabilise cash flows, 
but undermined subsequent stages of the turnaround associated with new investment 
and repositioning.  
Exit was positively but weakly related to high borrowing in model (1). Exiting 
firms had higher leverage than turnaround firms (Table 3), but the difference was 
marginal compared to firms unsuccessfully attempting turnarounds. In models (2) and 
(3) leverage was negatively and significantly related to turnaround success. In other 
words lenders exerted weak pressure on firms to exit and acted as a constraint for the 
firms that stayed in the industry and attempted turnarounds. Firms with relatively high 
debt were less likely to pay dividends. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis 
suggests that opportunistic managers may try to appropriate FCF at expense of minority 
shareholders, and presence of fixed-claim holders may restrain this opportunism. There 
is some evidence from the data in Table 1 that debt holders did indeed constrain 
directors. The banks therefore did what they were supposed to do under the FCF 
hypothesis, even though for Keynes this wasn’t enough.  
Finally SIZE had a significant and negative impact on exit and was positive and 
strongly significantly associated with turnaround success. Insofar as SIZE proxies for 
managerial power, the impact is the same direction as PUBLIC, supporting the view 
from the archival evidence that managerial groups were able to combine long run 
investment strategy with good knowledge of the industry. However, the speculation 
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that enabled them to build business empires and appropriate associated rents in the 
pre-war period went badly wrong after 1920. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Keynes’s assertion that capacity mattered is true and no one would dispute the 
problems caused by over-capacity and weak selling. However, we would dispute the 
assertion that capacity was all that mattered and that capitalisation was unimportant. 
Indeed, following from the above analysis the reverse is true, and capitalisation was a 
serious barrier to exit for some firms and to re-organisation by others. It was more 
significant than bank debt, and indeed, as has been demonstrated, bank debt performed 
its correct function of disciplining managers and associated insider groups. 
Over-capitalisation was serious without bank debt and would have become serious 
even without over-capacity, committing Lancashire firms to high fixed capital costs as 
overseas competitors entered export markets. Changing capital structures, thereby 
undoing the mistakes of 1919-20 was therefore essential for the recovery of the industry. 
Even in the relatively weak legal framework of the 1920s, however, radical variation of 
ownership rights (writing off the capital of a whole industry) was non-trivial. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, the only contemporaries calling for this solution were the 
speculators themselves, and they were unlikely to be received sympathetically by 
economists, policy makers or anyone else. The real irony is that like Keynes they 
recognised through their own mistakes, the need for an end to laissez-faire. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
  Min  Max  Mean   S.dev  
 
 
Continuous variables: 
APTC   -6.696  2.079  -0.272  0.825*** 
DIV    0.000  25.000  3.630  5.580*** 
LEV   0.000  1.903  0.368  0.338*** 
SIZE   8.144  13.473  11.567  0.877** 
 
Grouping variables: 
EXIT       0.224 
RECAP      0.476 
PUBLIC      0.776 
 
 
S-Wilk p-value: 
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
 
Data definitions: 
APTC: Accumulated profit to capital ratio, 1926-1931.    
DIV: Dividend as a percentage of paid up capital.     
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
EXIT: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm exits, = 0 otherwise 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix (independent variables) 
 
 
 
RECAP PUBLIC   LEV  SIZE 
    
 
RECAP     1.0000  
PUBLIC     -0.1726**   1.0000  
LEV       0.0985   -0.0230 1.0000  -0.0592 
SIZE      -0.3476***   0.1656**   1.0000  
 
 
Spearman’s Rho (below diagonal)/Pearson’s co-efficient (above diagonal) significance 
levels 
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
 
 
Data definitions: 
APTC: Accumulated profit to capital ratio, 1926-1931.    
DIV: Dividend as a percentage of paid up capital.     
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
EXIT: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm exits, = 0 otherwise 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for strategic outcomes 
 
 
 
STRATEGY  VARIABLE 
 
 
  APTC DIV RECAP PUBLIC LEV SIZE 
 N  % N N  £ 
Turnaround    
- Success 58 0.152 8.780 37 50 0.289 172,671 
- Fail 56 -0.282 0.435 20 43 0.408 141,392 
Exits 33 -0.999 0.000 13 21 0.436 112,631 
 
 
Data definitions: 
APTC: Accumulated profit to capital ratio, 1926-1931.    
DIV: Dividend as a percentage of paid up capital.     
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 4: Regression models 
 
 
Model     (1)  (2)  (3) 
    Logit  OLS  Tobit 
 
Dependent variable  EXIT  APTC  DIV 
 
Independent variables: 
CONST   11.386*** -4.083** -62.168*** 
0.001  0.036  0.000 
RECAP   -1.406*** 0.444** 13.293*** 
    0.002  0.013  0.000 
PUBLIC   -0.955** -0.072  6.936*** 
0.042  0.612  0.005 
LEV    0.843  -0.589** -11.397*** 
    0.155  0.014  0.000 
SIZE    -1.019*** 0.334** 4.504*** 
0.001  0.037  0.000 
 
R-square1   0.151  0.184  0.114 
Prob2         0.000  0.000  0.000 
Residual S-Wilk  N/A  0.000  N/A 
 
 
Co-efficients are reported for each independent variable with respective p-values 
underneath. N = 147 for all models. In model (3) 95 observations are left-censored at 0. 
In models (1) and (2) p-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimation matrix. All models were re-tested with serial deletion of 
inter-correlated variables and insertion of interaction variables. The results were robust 
to alternative specifications. Model (2) was re-tested using a non-parametric 
formulation (quantile regression). Model co-efficients signs remained unchanged and 
significance levels increased marginally for significant co-efficients in the OLS model. 
 
1 Psuedo in models (1) and (3), adjusted in model (2) 
2 >Chi in models (1) and (3), and > F in model (2) 
 
Two-tailed significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05 
 
 
Data definitions: 
APTC: Accumulated profit to capital ratio, 1926-1931.    
DIV: Dividend as a percentage of paid up capital.     
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
EXIT: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm exits, = 0 otherwise 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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i Calculated from Mitchell and Deane (1963) and Robson (1957). 
 
ii Burnett-Hurst, ‘Lancashire and the Indian Market’, p.398. 
 
iii For example E.H. Stockton, the Chairman of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
pointed out mills passing into the hands of any ‘syndicate who have no knowledge of 
the conditions of an intricate industry is certain to lead to disaster’. Oldham Chronicle, 
25th November, 1919. 
 
iv Beehive re-floated with a nominal share capital of 2 million two-shilling shares 
(£200,000). The annual return for this company in 1938 indicates that 23% of this stock 
was owned by the following London based accounts: Midland Bank Nominee; 
Morrison Nominees; Barclays Bank Nominees; Branch Nominees; Control Nominees; 
Roycan Nominees, and one London based group not specified.   
 
v  Another example was the Lancashire Cotton Syndicate Ltd, with a registered address 
in London, but organised at least in part by local cotton mill managers. Alfred Holt was 
the Managing Director of the Syndicate and mill manager of Bolton Union Spinning 
Company. 
   
vi Argyll, Broadway; Fernhurst, Gee Cross Mill, Gorse, Greenacres, Hartford, Marland, 
Mars, Mersey, Monton, Moor, Orb, Peel Mills Co, Princess, Rugby, and Stockport 
Ring Mill.   Mellor built up a substantial shareholding in many of these companies, for 
example, Argyll (7.55%), and Asia Mill (3.8%). 
 26
                                                                                                                                            
 
vii  Other stockbrokers included Henry Hood and Charles Thwaites. 
 
viii As far as we can tell, the only contemporary economist who advocated a comparable 
scheme was Allen, who proposed that, in a scheme of rationalisation, the surviving 
firms should make a debenture issue and use the proceeds to acquire the capital of firms 
which were to close down.  In these schemes, Allen proposed that the owners of the 
closed plants would receive a cash payment representing the pre-rationalisation value 
of their interest plus an additional sum equivalent to their capitalised share of the 
additional profit which the industry was expected to earn as a result of the scheme. Of 
course, as with the Hammersely scheme, Allen recognised that his proposal would only 
work with government intervention. (Allen, 1945,189). 
 
ix These stockbrokers were sometimes responsible for substantial short-term sales of 
stock. Thus, for example Hood and Tweedale between them sold 30.3% of Century 
stock between December 1919 and August 1920, while Herbert Bridge, sold 3.75% of 
Ace stock between May 1920 and October 1920. 
 
x  For a biographical discussion of the activities of three generations of the Stott family, 
1862-1937, see Farnie and Gurr, (1998), pp.15-18. 
 
xi  The review of archival evidence above showed that the majority of syndicates were 
local cliques of interlocking directors. It would have been interesting to specify a 
variable to test the effects of inside and outside ownership blocks. Unfortunately the 
shareholder registers are only available for a small sub-set of the total sample. 
